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Donald Trump projects slogans more than strategy, yet his administration has moved quickly and 
with vigour to dismantle existing climate policies in the United States. As this analysis underlines, 
a robust system of political checks and balances will constrain the domestic deregulatory 
agenda, although Trump’s actions  may disturb the delicate balance of interests in international 
climate negotiations. A long view on the legal and political system of the United States – from 
the ideological foundations of American political reaction to the federal constitution and its 
Madisonian separation of powers – is necessary to understand whether the policy direction charted 
by the current administration can prevail. 
At first glance, the scale of regulatory roll-back appears unprecedented. Procedural and judicial 
limitations on federal powers that long predate awareness of climate change may nonetheless 
afford existing climate action surprising resilience against deconstruction. Still, the cumulative 
effects of deregulation, budget cuts, and personnel choices will eventually impact the scale and 
speed of  decarbonization.
At the diplomatic level, severely diminished contributions to international climate finance will 
impact the political dynamic in international climate negotiations, while a disengaged  is likely 
to have an unsettling effect on the stocktaking and periodic review processes under the Paris 
Agreement. Some of these effects can be compensated by market forces and invigorated action by 
cities and states. Meanwhile, the underlying politics in the  remain as partisan as ever. Even if 
contemporary policy decisions prove to be temporary outliers, a sobering insight from this analysis 
is that science denialism and political opportunism will surface time and again in the  public 
debate on climate change.
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Introduction: ‘Mourning for America’
‘We’ll be mourning for America, an America 
that was lost on Obama’s watch.’ 
Donald J. Trump, Time to Get Tough: Making 
America #1 Again (Regnery 2011)
Donald Trump’s ascent to the presidency was 
met with disbelief and shock among those 
following climate change science and politics 
– both domestically and abroad. Viewed across 
a longer time horizon, however, it becomes 
clear that the strain of populism he entertains 
is nothing new in American history, nor for 
that matter in the history of Western politics. It 
resonates with a powerful nostalgia for bygone 
greatness that has gained inluence time and 
again during the past two centuries, sounding 
a call to arms against political and economic 
decline as well as cultural decadence.1
Trump and his allies have leveraged this nar-
rative to mobilize an agenda premised on the 
reversal of a perceived national crisis, ofering 
a return to an erstwhile, more hopeful world 
with their slogan of ‘Making America Great 
Again’. Such wistfulness for a better past was 
also emblematic of Ronald Reagan’s presidency, 
for instance, who famously invoked a narrative 
of rebirth to describe his irst term in oice 
– ‘morning again in America’ – and sought to 
realize his country’s promise as a ‘shining city 
on a hill’.2 
his is an old story, especially pronounced in 
European modernity after the French Revolu-
tion. As Mark Lilla describes it, political nos-
talgia ‘settled like a cloud on European thought 
after the French Revolution and has never fully 
1  Mark Lilla, The Shipwrecked Mind: On Political Reac-
tion (New York Review of Books 2016).
2  Ronald Reagan, ‘Farewell Address to the Nation’ (11 
January 1989), <https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/
archives/speeches/1989/011189i.htm> accessed 28 
March 2017. 
lifted’.3 he mass appeal of reactionary ideas 
has come in many waves, including early 19th 
century Germany and its Kierkegaardian mood; 
the traumatic wake of World War I and Oswald 
Spengler’s inluential he Decline of the West; 
and the reckoning with World War II and the 
horrors of the Holocaust. All of these periods 
have inspired narratives of cultural pessimism, 
in which a break  in the history of ideas sets in 
motion intellectual and political decline, and 
a subsequent political project that suggests a 
return to an earlier, healthier order. 
Reagan’s vision was one of a city ‘teeming with 
people of all kinds’, a city ‘with free ports’ 
whose ‘walls had doors and the doors were 
open to anyone’.4 By contrast, Trump’s politi-
cal machinery has charted a darker, distinctly 
nationalist future for the US, and in doing so 
is departing from the commitment of recent 
administrations – both Republican and Demo-
cratic – to global engagement and international 
trade. Still, if one reaches far enough into the 
American past, isolationism, and indeed the 
slogan ‘America First’, is not an unfamiliar 
theme, dating back to the struggle for inde-
pendence, and periodically deining US foreign 
policy up until the irst half of the 20th century. 
Its rhetoric remains remarkably current, with 
narratives of American primacy and a protec-
tionist, inward-looking bias. And in a nation 
where ethnic diversity and segregation have 
lived side by side in an uneasy standof since 
its earliest days, it is no surprise that even the 
racial undertones of Trump’s populism join a 
longer American tradition of white nationalism, 
in which conceptions of ‘the people’ are tacitly 
narrowed to a ‘people held together by com-
mon blood and skin color’,5 focusing blame and 
3  Lilla (n. 1), p. 28.
4  Reagan (n. 2).
5  Gary Gerstle, American Crucible: Race and Nation 
in the Twentieth Century (Princeton University Press 
2017), 4.
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resentment on alternating groups of foreigners 
or minorities.6 
Donald Trump’s campaign and early presidency 
have been described as lacking a coherent pro-
gramme or a set of policies, relying on identity 
politics and an unspeciic, reactionary agenda. 
his naturally raises a number of questions. 
First, how does climate change, perhaps the 
greatest global challenge humanity has ever 
faced, feature in his actual policies? Second, the 
American judiciary system, political checks and 
balances, and constitutional limits on federal 
powers constrain the ability of any adminis-
tration to enact its own agenda. How do these 
limitations play out in Donald Trump’s vision 
for domestic climate policy? hird, what are the 
international implications of President Trump’s 
actions? 
Analyzing the populist messaging is not enough 
to answer these questions. Both law and poli-
tics – the ideological foundations and patterns 
of American political reaction, as well as the 
legal-political system and its separation of 
powers – need to be taken into consideration 
when assessing whether the policy direction 
charted by the current administration can 
prevail. Our analysis is structured as follows: 
First, we briely describe the role of partisan-
ship in US politics, focusing on how it has 
shaped the politics of climate change. he next 
section discusses eforts to roll back the cli-
mate legacy of the Obama administration, and 
the extent to which this project is constrained 
by legal obstacles and market forces. We then 
turn to the more speculative question of how 
an evolving US climate policy agenda will afect 
international relations. Lastly, we draw some 
conclusions.
6  See, for instance, Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: 
Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act (U of 
North Carolina Press 1998); see also Richard Hofstad-
ter’s seminal work, The Paranoid Style in American 
Politics (Alfred A. Knopf 1965).
Backdrop: Partisanship and climate 
politics on the American right
‘This very expensive   bullshit has got to stop.’ 
Donald J. Trump, Twitter, 2 January 2014
Two political developments stand out over the 
past half century which, although not without 
precedent, seem to have reached a point of 
conluence that falls beyond the bounds of his-
torical experience. Environmental policy, cur-
rently spearheaded by the climate change issue, 
has been fundamentally afected by these twin 
tendencies of radicalization and polarization.
First, the social and economic policies espoused 
by past administrations – both Democratic and 
Republican – have contributed to record levels 
of inequality along a number of metrics,7 exac-
erbating the impacts of other drivers such as 
globalization, automation, and broader demo-
graphic trends.8 Together, these forces have 
altered the fabric of American society, sunder-
ing the economic realities of a vast majority 
of working families from those of the monied 
establishment. Meanwhile, a steady rise in the 
proportion of ethnic and religious minorities 
has incessantly eroded the traditional domi-
nance of white protestant America, and with it 
the cohesive weave of values, ideals and beliefs 
that deined the cultural legacy of earlier gen-
erations.9 In the wake of this transformational 
dynamic, large segments of the white popula-
tion are said to feel a profound sense of betrayal 
7  US wealth has concentrated to a degree not seen for a 
century, with the wealthiest 0.1% of households own-
ing more than the bottom 90%; Larry M. Bartels, Un-
equal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New 
Gilded Age (2nd edn Princeton University Press 2016).
8  Robert J. Gordon, The Rise and Fall of American 
Growth: The U.S. Standard of Living since the Civil 
War (Princeton University Press 2016).
9  William H. Frey, The Diversity Explosion: How New 
Racial Demographics are Remaking America (Brook-
ings Institution Press 2015).
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and mourning for a way of life that now seems 
lost, replaced with a mass culture that prizes 
cosmopolitanism and racial diversity. Com-
pelled by economic disenfranchisement, nativ-
ist sentiments, and fear of the unknown, this 
group – so the widespread  diagnosis goes – has 
projected its political hopes onto a reactionary 
project, laying fertile ground for fringe political 
candidates such as Donald Trump.
Economic and cultural upheaval are not the 
only battlegrounds that have seen a compound 
change, however. A second factor has been 
what is often described as the growing dys-
function of government, which is, on closer 
assessment, the product of a complex medley of 
drivers. Among these is the ideological polari-
zation and strategic partisanship evident across 
the political spectrum. he current situation 
is remarkably at odds with the Madisonian 
governing process set out in the constitutional 
charter and has become a recipe for ‘willful 
obstruction and policy avoidance’.10 Impor-
tantly, this radicalization of party politics has 
not been symmetrical. One party – the Repub-
licans – has been described as ‘an insurgent 
outlier – ideologically extreme; contemptuous 
of the inherited social and economic policy 
regime; scornful of compromise; unpersuaded 
by conventional understanding of facts, evi-
dence, and science; and dismissive of the legiti-
macy of its political opposition’.11 Polarization 
is further ampliied by certain idiosyncrasies 
of the US political system, such as an electoral 
college and Senate that tie votes to geography 
rather than population, partisan redistricting 
(gerrymandering), and a rollback of campaign 
10  Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, It’s Even 
Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitution-
al System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism 
(expanded edn, Basic Books, 2016) xxiii.
11  Ibid. xxiv; tracing this asymmetry and the radicaliza-
tion of the Republican Party to the Goldwater move-
ment of the 1960s: Eugene J. Dionne jr., Why the Right 
Went Wrong: Conservatism – From Goldwater to 
Trump and Beyond (Simon & Schuster 2016).
inance reforms. It also gains impetus from a 
growing body of partisan media outlets, such as 
talk radio, cable news, and social media, which 
attract and reinforce homogenous audiences 
with iltered views,12 while mainstream media 
strive for evenhanded treatment of all view-
points in what has been described as a pattern 
of ‘false balance’. None of these factors may 
be new, but their concurrence and intensity 
appear to defy precedent.
These forces have channeled the growing 
discontent of a large share of the electorate, 
precipitating an outcome that questions the 
establishment and gives voice to a widely held 
disdain for intellectual and political elites.13 No 
longer feeling represented by the traditional 
parties, such voters embraced Donald Trump 
with a passion shown for few other presiden-
tial candidates, and seem willing to tolerate a 
radicalization of government, even if it comes 
at the expense of science, civic discourse, and 
other norms and institutions of a functioning 
democracy.14 As such, therefore, the populism 
that has risen to power in Washington is fun-
damentally diferent from the traditional con-
servative mainstream, and draws support from 
an energized, uncompromising base. 
Historically, America is widely credited with 
pioneering environmental policy in the 20th 
century, and some of the greatest strides 
were taken during conservative administra-
tions. hese include the extensive conservation 
12  Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet is 
Hiding From You (Penguin Press 2011).
13  Akin to the concept of ‘de-subordination’ proposed by 
Ralph Miliband, ‘A State of De-Subordination’ (1978) 
29 Brit J Sociology, 399; see also Michèle Lamont, The 
Dignity of Working Men: Morality and the Bounda-
ries of Race, Class, and Immigration (Harvard U Press 
2002).
14  Alan Johnson, ‘After These Days of Rage’ (New York 
Times, 9 November 2016) A1.
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measures of heodore Roosevelt Jr.,15 as well 
as the passage of landmark environmental 
legislation and the establishment of relevant 
federal agencies, such as the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), under Richard M. 
Nixon.16 Although compelled less by passion 
than political opportunism, Nixon was able to 
declare in his irst State of the Union address 
that ‘[r]estoring nature to its natural state is a 
cause beyond party and beyond factions’.17 Still, 
the susceptibility of modern environmental 
policy – and notably of restrictions on pollution 
– to political partisanship was already apparent 
from the outset, with the Republican Party 
and its commitment to business interests and 
limited government invariably more inclined 
to oppose environmental action on ideological 
grounds.18 
A widening gap between the environmental 
policy platforms of both parties became espe-
cially evident during the election season of 1980, 
in which Republicans displayed a ‘determined 
15  Douglas Brinkley, The Wilderness Warrior: Theo-
dore Roosevelt and the Crusade for America (2009) ch 
15–26.
16  In addition to the EPA, Nixon approved the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) and established the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
at the US Department of Commerce; in all, he signed 14 
major pieces of legislation protecting the environment. 
For an insider overview, see Russell E. Train, Politics, 
Pollution, and Pandas: An Environmental Memoir (Is-
land Press 2003), ch 7–9.
17  Richard M. Nixon, ‘Annual Message to the Congress on 
the State of the Union’ (22 January 1970) <www.pres-
idency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2921> accessed 31 March 
2017.
18  Riley E. Dunlap and Richard P. Gale, ‘Party Member-
ship and Environmental Politics: A Legislative Roll-Call 
Analysis’ (1974) 55 Social Science Q 670. 
commitment to end the environmental tide’19 
and incorporated the rollback of related regu-
latory constraints in their campaign platform. 
With his irst budget proposal, Ronald Reagan 
foreshadowed contemporary events with a 
request for substantial cuts to EPA programmes 
and staf, provoking a massive partisan back-
lash and ultimately political embarrassment for 
his administration.20 In 1982, a special report 
by the Republican Study Committee, a group 
of 150 conservative members of the House of 
Representatives, denounced the ‘specter of 
environmentalism’, which it saw as a threat to 
economic growth and a channel for environ-
mental ‘extremists’ to further their broader 
political and social agenda; opposing envi-
ronmental policy, it concluded, thus ofered a 
political opportunity for the Republican party.21 
It did not take long for the consensus underly-
ing earlier environmental policy to give way to 
a strong partisan divide, with few other policy 
issues revealing greater diferences between 
Democrats and Republicans.22 
If anything, this pattern of partisanship is even 
more pronounced in the context of climate 
change, where even empirical science has 
become politicized. After Lyndon B. Johnson 
first afforded the topic national visibility 
19  Samuel P. Hays, Beauty, Health, and Permanence: En-
vironmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985 
(CUP 1989) 491.
20  For a detailed account, see Jonathan Lash, David Sher-
idan, and Katherine Gillman, A Season of Spoils: The 
Reagan Administration’s Attack on the Environment 
(Pantheon Books 1984).
21  James Morton Turner, ‘“The Spectre of Environ-
mentalism”: Wilderness, Environmental Politics, and 
the Evolution of the New Right’ (2009), 96 Journal of 
American History 123. 
22  Riley E. Dunlap, Chenyang Xiao and Aaron M. Mc-
Cright, ‘Politics and Environment in America: Partisan 
and Ideological Cleavages in Public Support for Envi-
ronmentalism’ (2001), 10 Environmental Politics 23, 30.
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in 1965 with a special message to Congress, 
the earliest major policy action – ratifying 
the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992 – still 
enjoyed bipartisan endorsement.23 Soon after, 
however, support for climate action began to 
erode, starting with the spectacular failure of 
William J. Clinton’s efort to pass a tax on the 
heat content of energy in 1993.24 he polariza-
tion in the climate issue was catalyzed by the 
lobbying work of conservative charities such 
as the Cooler Heads Coalition, launched in 1997, 
calling climate science a hoax and environmen-
talists ‘global warming alarmists’.25 Climate 
change was subsequently framed as a highly 
ideological issue, in which ‘big government’ is 
looking for greater authority to regulate every 
aspect of the economy and curtail individual 
liberty.
Substantial pressure from industry groups and 
labour unions sometimes occasioned resistance 
against climate action from both sides of the 
political aisle, as exempliied by a unanimous 
Senate resolution rejecting asymmetrical com-
mitments in the international climate negotia-
tions.26 Still, positions on climate change were 
mostly divided along party lines, and became 
increasingly partisan in response to federal 
inaction and the withdrawal from the Kyoto 
Protocol during the administration of George 
23  A rare supermajority in the Senate on 15 October 1992 
backed the accession by George H. W. Bush, a Republi-
can president.
24  On the defeat of the British Thermal Unit (BTU) tax in 
the US Senate, see Amy Royden, ‘U.S. Climate Change 
Policy Under President Clinton: A Look Back’ (2002) 32 
Golden Gate University Law Review, 415, 419–20.
25  ‘A Two-decade Crusade by Conservative Chari-
ties Fuelled Trump’s Exit from Paris Climate Accord’ 
(Washington Post, 5 September 2017).
26  US Senate, 105th Congress, 1st Session, S. Res. 98 ‘By-
rd-Hagel Resolution’ (25 July 1997), <www.national-
center.org/KyotoSenate.html> accessed 1 April 2017. 
W. Bush, as well as the far more activist agenda 
of his successor, Barack H. Obama.
After years of American climate renitence under 
President George W. Bush, the consequential 
pivot under his successor, Barack Obama, 
helped align US policy with the climate ambi-
tions of most other industrialized nations. But 
what may have seemed like a return to nor-
malcy for observers outside the US can also be 
seen as a deviation from the norm, a pendulum 
swung to the other end of progressive climate 
action. It is important to recall that Congress 
remained staunchly split along partisan lines 
on climate action during President Obama’s 
irst term, and, if anything, opposition from 
Congressional Republicans, conservative states, 
and entrenched interests only grew during his 
second term in response to his agenda of regu-
latory activism. Hence, in many ways, the stage 
was set for a renewed pendulum swing in US 
climate policy when Donald Trump took oice. 
And while Trump has repeatedly deied his 
party’s establishment, both as a candidate and 
as President, his views on climate change are 
in alignment with the vast majority of fellow 
Republicans.
Unravelling the Obama legacy
‘[W]e’re putting a lot of people out of work. 
Our energy policies are a disaster.’
Donald J. Trump, 1st Presidential Debate, 
Hempstead, N.Y., 26 September 2016
As a candidate during the controversial election 
season, Donald Trump repeatedly vowed to 
overturn the climate legacy of his predecessor, 
citing doubts about the very existence of cli-
mate change,27 and arguing that related policy 
27  On 6 November 2012, Donald J. Trump famously 
tweeted: ‘The concept of global warming was created 
by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufac-
turing non-competitive’, followed by several tweets in 
2013 and 2014 describing climate change as a ‘hoax’.
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measures were harming the US economy and 
destroying jobs. Still, given that he had at one 
point expressed support for robust climate 
action,28 it initially remained unclear as to 
what extent the conlicting remarks Trump 
made during the campaign would also shape 
his executive decisions once he had assumed 
oice. A number of early policy steps, however, 
provide growing evidence of the policy vision 
of the new administration – a vision that is 
remarkably consistent with candidate Trump’s 
campaign rhetoric. 
Many of the central pillars of this vision can be 
traced back to a campaign speech the candidate 
held before an annual petroleum conference in 
Bismarck, North Dakota, on 26 May 2016. On 
this occasion, he outlined the contours of his 
‘America First Energy Plan’, which included 
immediate steps to rescind executive actions 
on climate change, lift restrictions on fossil fuel 
extraction, ‘cancel the Paris Climate Agreement 
and stop all payments of U.S. tax dollars to U.N. 
global warming programs’.29 Likewise, his 
appointments to lead the transition at key gov-
ernment agencies suggested an uncompromis-
ing hostility towards environmental safeguards, 
and towards climate policy in particular. Fears 
that President Trump would undo years of pro-
gress on climate policy received further impe-
tus when he announced his designated cabinet, 
28  See, for instance, a letter addressed to President Ba-
rack Obama and the US Congress printed in the New 
York Times (6 December 2009) calling for a global cli-
mate deal at COP 15, signed by Donald Trump and 
three of his children: ‘We support your effort to en-
sure meaningful and effective measures to control cli-
mate change, an immediate challenge facing the United 
States and the world today’.
29  Donald J. Trump, ‘An America First Energy Plan’ (26 
May 2016) <www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releas-
es/an-america-first-energy-plan> accessed 29 March 
2017. Most of these pledges are contained in a version 
uploaded to the White House website, ‘An America 
First Energy Plan’ <www.whitehouse.gov/america-
first-energy> accessed 29 March 2017.
with a number of prospective members who 
have long ties to the fossil fuel industry or a 
track record of opposing government action 
on climate change. 
A key theme in the Trump campaign held that 
overregulation was ‘strangling’ or ‘choking’ 
American economic growth and entrepre-
neurialism.30 his narrative is a popular one 
within the Republican Party and has a history 
in conservative campaigns, namely in the Rea-
gan era, but again, the reactionary dimension 
of Trump’s administration goes beyond previ-
ous initiatives. Arguments for deregulation are 
now levelled against Democrats and liberal 
elites, who, according to the populist narra-
tive, do not care about workers and jobs, but 
are instead preoccupied with cultural identities, 
equality, and other ideological concerns of the 
coastal elites.31 
During the presidential campaign, this theme 
of deregulation was repeatedly highlighted as 
a key solution for economic growth. Expec-
tations of such growth are promised for the 
manufacturing and energy sectors in ‘Real 
America’, and this includes coal mining and use, 
which face stif competition from natural gas 
and renewables. Big pipeline projects such as 
the Keystone XL and Dakota Access have their 
stimulus efects as iscal policies, and also con-
siderable appeal in Trumpian identity politics.
Faced with this sweeping agenda, many 
observers questioned whether Donald Trump 
30  See e.g., Donald J. Trump, 1st Presidential Debate, 
Hempstead, N.Y., 26 September 2016.
31  ‘In truth, today’s Democrats aren’t much interested 
in the well-being of working stiffs. Instead, they are 
enraptured with new plans to advance identity poli-
tics, co-ed bathrooms, and #BlackLivesMatter. All the 
while, of course, keeping the border open and sup-
pressing energy production and economic activity.’ 
See ‘The Ten Ideologies of America: As Donald Trump 
Overthrows the Old Order, a Look at the New’ (Breit-
bart, 20 March 2016).
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the president would be able to follow through 
with the promises he had made as Donald 
Trump the candidate. During the irst year of 
his presidency, however, the White House has 
already initiated a review or rescission of sev-
eral federal climate policies, and also initiated 
a fundamental pivot in international climate 
engagement. If anything, therefore, the speed 
and scope of policy change has taken commen-
tators by surprise. Still, the implementation 
of this deregulatory and isolationist agenda 
faces numerous challenges, from subnational 
and local activism to market forces; both the 
evolving policy roadmap and these obstacles 
are described in the following section.
Regulatory reform
An early harbinger of the regulatory reform 
agenda of the new administration was promptly 
unveiled on inauguration day, when the former 
White House Chief of Staf Reinhold R. Priebus 
issued a memorandum to all agencies order-
ing a regulatory freeze and halting all new or 
pending regulations.32 Among the rules afected 
by this memorandum are a number of energy 
eiciency and renewable fuel standards, along 
with several dozen other rules issued by the 
EPA and Department of Energy during the last 
months of the previous administration.33 Presi-
dent Trump signed an Executive Order soon 
after requiring federal agencies to repeal at least 
two existing regulations for every newly issued 
regulation, and to do so in a way that ensures 
32  White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Memo-
randum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies’ (20 January 2017) <www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2017/01/20/memorandum-heads-
executive-departments-and-agencies> accessed 29 
March 2017.
33  See, for instance, the list compiled by the EPA, ‘Delay 
of Effective Date for 30 Final Regulations Published by 
the Environmental Protection Agency Between October 
28, 2016 and January 17, 2017’ of 26 January 2017 (2017) 
82(16) Federal Register 8499.
the total cost of regulations does not increase.34 
In order to regulate, the administration should 
duly rewrite existing regulation or axe an 
existing rule. Signiicantly, the beneits of new 
regulations may not be included in this calcu-
lation, a departure from traditional practice 
even during the Reagan administration, when 
beneits needed to exceed the cost.35 If a climate 
policy initiative is projected to cost 100 million 
dollars, the utility calculus cannot count the 
savings on health, such as decreasing cases of 
asthma, into the equation. A subsequent Exec-
utive Order ensures observance of this agenda 
by establishing a Regulatory Reform Oicer and 
Task Force in each agency.36 Although these 
orders raise many questions and their legality 
is, in many cases, under dispute, they signal a 
strong commitment by the new administration 
to unravelling the framework of executive rules 
and interpretations iterated over the years by 
previous administrations. 
Federal budget 
In March the White House released its budget 
blueprint for 2018.37 With an emphasis on 
national security and public safety, the budget 
blueprint proposes significant increases in 
defence spending, homeland security, and 
34  Executive Order 13771, ‘Reducing Regulation and 
Controlling Regulatory Costs’ of 30 January 2017 (2017) 
82(22) Federal Register 9339.
35  ‘Why Trump’s Order to Cut Government Regulation Is 
Even Bolder than it Seems’ (Washington Post, 13 Feb-
ruary 2017).
36  Executive Order 13777, ‘Enforcing the Regulatory Re-
form Agenda’ of 24 February 2017 (2017) 82(39) Federal 
Register 12285.
37  Executive Office of the United States, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, ‘America First: A Budget Blue-
print to Make America Great Again’ (16 March 2017)  
<www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
omb/budget/fy2018/2018_blueprint.pdf> accessed 29 
March 2017.
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law enforcement as ‘a message of American 
strength, security, and resolve’. Extensive cut-
backs to unrelated agencies and programmes 
would maintain budget neutrality and avoid 
increasing national debt. Among the agencies 
hardest hit by proposed expenditure cuts are 
the three agencies with substantial responsi-
bilities for climate change: the EPA, the Depart-
ment of Energy, and the Department of State. 
Speciically, the blueprint proposed shrinking 
the EPA budget by 31.4% to $5.7 billion, the 
largest cut in relative terms to any federal 
agency, and a signiicantly larger cut than 
requested by Congressional Republicans.38 
In particular, the blueprint discontinues ‘fund-
ing for the Clean Power Plan, international 
climate change programs, climate change 
research and partnership programs, and related 
eforts’,39 including a cut of 224 staf and 14 vol-
untary programs under the Climate Protection 
Program. For the Department of Energy, the 
budget blueprint requests $28.0 billion, a 5.6% 
decrease, with decreases of 17.9% for the Oice 
of Energy Eiciency and Renewable Energy, 
and the Advanced Research Projects Agency-
Energy. Extensive cuts are also requested for 
the Department of State and associated inter-
national programs,40 which would see their 
budget reduced by 28% to $25.6 billion. 
Citing the need to achieve an ‘appropriate U.S. 
share of international spending’ and ‘reduce 
or end direct funding for international organi-
zations whose missions do not substantially 
38  See the critical assessment by former EPA Administra-
tor Christine Todd Whitman, ‘I Ran George W. Bush’s 
EPA—and Trump’s Cuts to the Agency Would Endanger 
Lives’ (The Atlantic, 31 March 2017) <www.theatlan-
tic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/trumps-epa-cuts-
budget/521223> accessed 31 March 2017.
39  Executive Office (n 50) 41.
40  These include the US Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID) and the International Programs at the 
Department of the Treasury, ibid. 33.
advance U.S. foreign policy interests’, the 
budget proposes eliminating ‘the Global 
Climate Change Initiative and … [to] cease 
payments to the United Nations’ (UN) climate 
change programs’.41 Other relevant areas 
threatened with dramatic spending cuts are the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion at the Department of Commerce and sub-
sidies for long-distance train services through 
the Department of Transportation.
In late May, the administration proceeded to 
release the full budget proposal for iscal year 
2018, upholding the proposed deep cuts already 
outlined in the blueprint.42 Not only does the 
proposal break down the requested cuts into 
greater detail, but it also extends the assault 
on programs and activities related to climate 
change. Entire regulatory frameworks, such as 
the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program requir-
ing large stationary emitters to report their 
greenhouse gas emissions, would be eliminated 
along with the attendant administrative capac-
ity. While the Congressional approval process 
– which had not yet concluded at the time of 
writing – will inevitably introduce signiicant 
changes, the proposals out of the White House 
have left little doubt about the administration’s 
priorities and its expressed objective of ‘focus-
ing funding to redeine the proper role of the 
Federal Government’.43
41  Specifically, the budget blueprint eliminates all US 
funding related to the Green Climate Fund and precur-
sor climate investment funds, see Executive Office (n 
50) 33.
42  Executive Office of the United States, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, ‘Budget of the U.S. Government: 
A New Foundation for American Greatness Fiscal Year 
2018’ (23 May 2017) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/fy2018/budg-
et.pdf> accessed 29 May 2017.
43  Executive Office (n 50) 5.
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Transportation sector
In 2016, after years of falling greenhouse gas 
emissions from electricity generation, the 
transportation sector became the single largest 
source of emissions in the US.44 It also became 
the irst target of executive climate action dur-
ing the administration of President Obama, 
when the EPA and other authorities issued joint 
greenhouse gas emissions standards for passen-
ger cars and light trucks manufactured between 
2012 and 2016. A second phase would require 
passenger cars and light trucks manufactured 
between 2017 and 2025 to achieve a leet aver-
age of 54.5 miles per gallon by 2025,45 contrib-
uting to a projected reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2 billion metric tons.46
he Trump administration announced in March 
that it would reinstate a midterm evaluation of 
the standards, signalling its intention to review 
whether these are excessively burdensome rel-
ative to the greenhouse gas emission reductions 
44  Energy Information Administration (EIA), ‘Month-
ly Energy Review March 2017’ 184–5 (28 March 
2017) <www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/ar-
chive/00351703.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
45  Equalling an average industry level of approximate-
ly 163 grams/mile of carbon dioxide (COൢ) in model year 
2025, see DOT NHTSA and EPA, ‘Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and 
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles: Phase 2; Final Rule’ 
of 16 August 2016, 40 CFR Parts 9, 22, 85, 86, 600, 1033, 
1036, 1037, 1039, 1042, 1043, 1065, 1066, and 1068, 49 
CFR Parts 523, 534, 535, and 538 (2016) 81(206) Federal 
Register 73478.
46  EPA Office of Transportation and Air Quality, ‘Regula-
tory Announcement EPA-420-F-12-05’ (1 August 2012) 
<https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P100EZ7C.
PDF?Dockey=P100EZ7C.PDF> accessed 29 March 2017.
and fuel savings they would achieve.47 Observ-
ers predict that the standards will be ‘substan-
tially relaxed’ in view of a changing vehicle leet 
following a period of low gasoline prices.48
Energy sector
Several measures adopted at the outset of the 
new administration share one central objective: 
to reduce the regulatory burden on oil, gas and 
coal production. Collectively, they recalibrate 
the balance of environmental and economic 
interests in the energy sector, as repeatedly 
pledged during the election campaign. As 
early as February, the Interior Department 
suspended and then, in April, formally pro-
posed repealing a revised accounting system to 
govern how oil and gas produced from federal 
leases is valued.49 Reforming the valuation 
methodology was expected to increase royalty 
payments. President Trump took another step 
towards regulatory reform in March when he 
signed an Executive Order directing the EPA 
and the US Army Corps of Engineers to revisit 
a federal rule that narrows the scope of federal 
safeguards for surface waters, lessening the 
permitting and compliance requirements for 
47  White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press 
Release of 15 March 2017 <www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2017/03/15/president-donald-j-
trump-buy-american-and-hire-american-united-
states> accessed 29 March 2017.
48  Jason P. Britt, ‘President Trump Orders EPA Re-
view of Corporate Average Fuel Economy Stand-
ards’ (Dashboard Insights, 20 March 2017) <www.
autoindustrylawblog.com/2017/03/20/president-
trump-orders-epa-review-of-corporate-average-
fuel-economy-standards> accessed 29 March 2017.
49  Department of the Interior, Office of Natural Resourc-
es Revenue, ‘Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Fed-
eral & Indian Coal Valuation Reform’ of 1 July 2016, 30 
CFR Parts 1202 and 1206 (2016) 81(127) Federal Regis-
ter 43338. 
THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 14
coal mining and oil and gas production.50 Less 
than a month after inauguration, Congress 
reversed rules on surface coal mining debris, 
the ‘Stream Protection Rule’ that had been 
issued by the previous administration to avoid 
‘material damage to the extent technologically 
and economically feasible’. 51
When it came to infrastructure, the new admin-
istration approved two controversial projects, 
the Keystone XL and the Dakota Access pipe-
lines, after ordering an expedited authorization 
process within days of the inauguration. Both 
projects remain highly politicized due to their 
potential impacts on water resources and the 
climate, as well as alleged violations of indig-
enous and tribal rights. Litigation against the 
approval decisions is already underway.52
Climate change
While each of the foregoing actions has ramii-
cations for US energy and environmental policy, 
an Executive Order signed on 28 March 201753 
is arguably the single measure most sweep-
ingly aimed at overturning the regulatory 
50  Executive Order 13778, ‘Restoring the Rule of Law, 
Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the 
“Waters of the United States” Rule’ of 28 February 2017 
(2017), 82(41) Federal Register 12497.
51  Department of the Interior, Office of Surface Mining 
Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE), ‘Stream Pro-
tection Rule’ (20 December 2016) 81(244) Federal Reg-
ister 93066.
52  See, e.g., Northern Plains Resource Council et al. v 
Department of State et al., Complaint for Declarative 
and Injunctive Relief filed with the US District Court for 
the District of Montana, Great Falls Division [30 March 
2017] <www.sierraclub.org/sites/www.sierraclub.
org/files/blog/Complaint%20filed%202017%2003%20
30.pdf> accessed 31 March 2017.
53  Executive Order 13783 of 28 March 2017, ‘Promoting 
Energy Independence and Economic Growth’ (2017) 
82(61) Federal Register 16093.
legacy on climate change left by the previous 
administration. he adoption of this order had 
been repeatedly postponed due to the political 
setbacks around healthcare legislation and the 
scrutiny of foreign ties within the administra-
tion. Titled ‘Promoting Energy Independence 
and Economic Growth’, it expressly identi-
ies as its objective ‘to promote clean and safe 
development of … energy resources’ while 
‘avoiding regulatory burdens that unneces-
sarily encumber energy production, constrain 
economic growth, and prevent job creation’.54 
During the signature ceremony, President 
Trump described its aims in more provocative 
terms as ‘putting an end to the war on coal’ and 
‘ending the theft of American prosperity’.55 
In terms of substance, the Executive Order 
consists of a number of directives to executive 
departments and agencies aimed at suspending, 
revising, or rescinding regulations. It goes on to 
detail a process requiring agencies to immedi-
ately review and identify ‘all […] agency actions 
that potentially burden the development or 
use of domestically produced energy resources, 
with particular attention to oil, natural gas, 
coal, and nuclear energy resources’. It further 
solicits each agency to submit within speciied 
timelines a plan for this review as well as, sub-
sequently, a report describing recommended 
actions. 
Additional provisions throughout the Execu-
tive Order direct agency heads to review or 
withdraw a number of speciic actions. Envi-
ronmental concerns are only mentioned inci-
dentally in all this, with the promotion of ‘clean 
air and clean water’ acknowledged as a policy 
objective, but only ‘to the extent permitted by 
54  Executive Order 13783 (n 77) Sec. 1(a).
55  White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump at Sign-
ing of Executive Order to Create Energy Independence’ 
(28 March 2017) <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2017/03/28/remarks-president-trump-signing-
executive-order-create-energy> accessed 30 March 
2017.
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law’ and ‘while also respecting the proper roles 
of the Congress and the States concerning these 
matters’. While the political intent of the order 
is to roll back climate policy measures of the 
previous administration, the word ‘climate’ is 
only mentioned in the context of the regula-
tions and reports to be rescinded. 
At the heart of the Executive Order are provi-
sions to reverse the Clean Power Plan.56 Its 
importance to former President Obama’s regu-
latory strategy on climate change is relected 
in his statement during the announcement 
ceremony that the Clean Power Plan was ‘the 
single most important step that America has 
ever made in the ight against global climate 
change’57 – a statement that stands in stark con-
trast to President Trump’s assessment during 
the release of his Executive Order, according to 
which ‘[p]erhaps no single regulation threatens 
our miners, energy workers, and companies 
more than this crushing attack on American 
industry’.58 Instructed to ‘immediately take all 
steps necessary to review’ the regulations and 
any related rules and guidance for consistency 
with the general objective of ‘avoiding regula-
tory burdens’, the EPA was mandated with sus-
pending, revising, or rescinding the guidance, 
‘if appropriate’ and ‘as soon as practicable’. 
Based on the foregoing review, the Admin-
istration announced a proposed rulemaking 
in early October 2017 which rejects the Clean 
Power Plan for ‘setting guidelines … that can 
only realistically be efected by measures that 
56  EPA, ‘Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Ex-
isting Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generat-
ing Units; Final Rule’ of 3 August 2015, 40 CFR Part 60 
(2015) 80(205) Federal Register 64661.
57  White House, ‘Remarks by the President in Announc-
ing the Clean Power Plan’ (3 August 2015) <https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-of-
fice/2015/08/03/remarks-president-announcing-
clean-power-plan> accessed 29 March 2017.
58  White House (n 79).
cannot be employed to, for, or at a particular 
source’, such as ‘generation shifting’ and 
‘actions taken across the electric grid.’59 Because 
it considers this a violation of its authorities 
under federal law, the EPA proposes to repeal 
the Clean Power Plan, adding that it ‘has not 
determined whether it will promulgate’ a 
replacement rule and, ‘if it will do so, when it 
will do so and what form that rule will take.’ 
Predictably, the announcement was met with 
public outcry, particularly its omission of a 
timeline for elaborating a replacement rule.60 
Following publication of the proposed repeal, 
the EPA will be required to accept and review 
public comment, and once the repeal takes 
efect it will likely be the target of vigorous 
judicial action. As long as the endangerment 
inding remains in place, moreover, the agency 
remains under an obligation to limit green-
house gas emissions from stationary sources. 
The limits of the regulatory roll-back
As outlined in the preceding section, execu-
tive climate action taken so far by the current 
administration focuses strongly on unravelling 
policies set in place by the previous adminis-
tration. Still, repealing the climate legacy of 
Barack Obama will not be an expeditious and 
straightforward process, even where those 
policies were implemented by way of agency 
regulations rather than statutory legislation.
Alternative pathways exist to undo the current 
climate policy framework, and each is sub-
ject to detailed procedural requirements and 
59  EPA, ‘Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines 
for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Gener-
ating Units’ (Draft, 9 October 2017) <https://static01.
nyt.com/news/cpprepeal.pdf> accessed 9 October 2017.
60  Jennifer A. Dlouhy, ‘Trump to Argue Obama’s Clean 
Power Plan Violates U.S. Law’ (Bloomberg, 5 Oc-
tober 2017) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-10-05/trump-is-said-to-argue-oba-
ma-s-clean-power-plan-violates-law> accessed on 9 
October 2017.
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constraints. Alternative pathways exist to undo 
the current climate policy framework, and each 
is subject to detailed procedural requirements 
and constraints.
Procedural inertia
While Congress has made extensive use of a 
power to ‘disapprove’ regulatory action taken 
during the previous session,61 it has only 
played a secondary role in reverting US climate 
policies to date, and will likely be even less 
inluential during the remainder of President 
Trump’s time in oice. Senate cloture and ili-
buster rules require a high voting threshold of 
60 votes to move most types of legislation to a 
Congressional vote,62 provided the Senate does 
not invoke a procedure that allows overriding 
rules or precedents by a simple majority of 51 
votes.63 Despite pressure from the White House, 
the Senate has not yet exercised that option, 
narrowing prospects for substantive legislation.
Where regulations are currently subject to 
pending litigation, as is the case with the Clean 
Power Plan, the administration efectively has 
an additional venue to stall or repeal climate 
regulations. Within months of its release, the 
Clean Power Plan became the most heavily 
litigated federal environmental regulation in 
61  104th Congress, H. R. 3136, ‘Contract with America Ad-
vancement Act of 1996’ (28 March 1996) Pub.L. 104–121, 
Sec. 251: Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking, 
U.S. Code Title 5 Part I Chapter 8§ 802(a).
62  US Senate, Rules of the Senate, ‘Precedence of Mo-
tions (Rule XXII)’: ‘three-fifths of the Senators duly 
chosen and sworn’.
63  A controversial procedure, known as the ‘consti-
tutional’ or ‘nuclear option’, which has rarely been 
invoked and is considered vital to protect bipartisan-
ship in the Senate; for background, see Betsy Palmer, 
‘Changing Senate Rules: The “Constitutional” or “Nu-
clear” Option’ (Congressional Research Service, 26 
May 2005) <http://research.policyarchive.org/176.
pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
US history.64 In theory, the new administration 
could ask the court to vacate the Clean Power 
Plan or simply decline to defend it, obviating 
the lengthy procedure needed to rescind the 
rule by way of executive action. But judicial 
precedent suggests a motion to vacate would 
be denied,65 and the interveners in support of 
the rule would also likely continue to defend 
the rule. Indeed, a coalition of 17 states, six 
municipalities and the District of Columbia 
had already registered their opposition to the 
foregoing motion.66 Instead, the EPA requested 
that the court hold the case in abeyance while 
it reconsiders the Clean Power Plan, a request 
that the court has granted.67 
Absent congressional or judicial repeal, the 
administration itself can overturn past meas-
ures through executive action. A majority of 
the Executive Orders described in the previous 
section direct federal agencies to review and, if 
appropriate, initiate proceedings to suspend, 
revise or rescind various guidelines, orders 
64  Samuel Kernell, Gary C. Jacobson, Thad Kousser, and 
Lynn Vavreck, The Logic of American Politics (8th edn, 
CQ Press 2018) 83.
65  A district court ruling in National Parks Conserva-
tion Association v Salazar, Case No. 1:09-cv-00115 (12 
August 2009) held that vacatur was not appropriate ab-
sent a merits ruling, significant new evidence, or the 
agreement of all parties, and that otherwise it would 
‘wrongfully permit the Federal defendants to bypass es-
tablished statutory procedures for repealing an agen-
cy rule’ under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 
see idem. 4–5.
66  US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, State of West 
Virginia et al., v EPA et al., No. 15-1363 (and consoli-
dated cases), ‘State and Municipal Respondent-Inter-
venors’ Opposition to Motion to Hold Proceeding in 
Abeyance’ (5 April 2017).
67  US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, State of West 
Virginia et al., v EPA et al., No. 15-1363 (and consoli-
dated cases), Order granting further abeyance (8 Au-
gust 2017).
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and regulations adopted during the previous 
administration. Where the administration 
decides to suspend, revise or rescind existing 
regulations, as in its proposed repeal of the 
Clean Power Plan, it has to adhere to an estab-
lished procedure. Under the Administrative 
Procedure Act and issue-speciic statutes such 
as the Clean Air Act, proposed rules suspend-
ing, revising, or rescinding existing rules have 
to be published for notice and comment,68 a 
protracted process that can require three to 
six months to complete and result in con-
siderable public input.69 What follows is the 
preparation of a inal rule, with any necessary 
revisions, along with development of appropri-
ate responses to public comments, continued 
stakeholder engagement, and legal and policy 
review of the rule, adding up to two more years 
to the process. A less onerous process applies to 
actions that did not go through formal notice 
and comment proceedings, such as Executive 
and Secretarial Orders, guidelines, and reports, 
all of which can be revoked with immediate 
efect by executive iat.
While the ability of federal agencies to revisit 
existing regulations, including the authority 
to reconsider and rescind or revise past deci-
sions, has been airmed with ample judicial 
precedent, such action must be supported by a 
‘reasonable explanation’ and demonstrate that 
‘there are good reasons for the new policy’.70 In 
68  79th Congress, S.7, ‘An Act to Improve the Administra-
tion of Justice by Prescribing Fair Administrative Pro-
cedure’ (11 June 1946) Pub.L. 79–404, 60 Stat. 237, U.S. 
Code Title 5 Part I Chapter 5 § 553.
69  In the case of the Clean Power Plan, for instance, 
the EPA received 4.3 million public comments, see 
EPA, ‘Fact Sheet: Clean Power Plan by the Numbers’ 
(3 August 2015) <www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2015-08/documents/fs-cpp-by-the-numbers.
pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
70  See US Supreme Court, Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) v Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 
U.S. 502, 515 (S. Ct. 28 April 2009).
efect, ruling on a regulatory reversal during the 
presidency of Ronald W. Reagan, the Supreme 
Court required that ‘[a]n agency changing its 
course by rescinding a rule is obligated to sup-
ply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond 
that which may be required when an agency 
does not act in the irst instance’.71 his is 
generally interpreted to mean that the agency 
must examine the relevant data and articulate 
a satisfactory explanation for its action, build-
ing a robust record of scientiic, economic, and 
other supporting information. 
In its proposal to repeal the Clean Power Plan, 
the EPA focused on a pivotal concept in the 
Clean Air Act, the ‘best system of emission 
reduction’, drawing on statutory language, 
legislative history, and prior agency practice 
to argue that the preceding administration had 
exceeded its federal authority when it required 
measures beyond the regulated sources them-
selves for compliance. Additionally, the pro-
posal relies on an analysis of avoided compli-
ance costs and foregone beneits, using changed 
deinitions and metrics to conclude that a 
repeal would result in net savings.72 While the 
underlying economic and legal reasoning will 
certainly be challenged, the agency has prob-
ably satisied the requirement of providing a 
‘reasonable explanation’ and ‘good reasons for 
the new policy.’
Still, as long as the endangerment inding for 
greenhouse gas emissions adopted during 
the previous administration remains in place 
– and despite recent steps by the EPA Admin-
istrator Scott Pruitt to orchestrate a ‘balanced’ 
debate on climate science, which some have 
interpreted as preparations to review the 
71  US Supreme Court, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers As-
sociation of the United States Inc. et al. v State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. et al., 463 U.S. 29, 42 
(S. Ct. 24 June 1983), para (a). See also Merrick B. Gar-
land, ‘Deregulation and Judicial Review’ (1985), 98 
Harvard Law Review 507.
72  EPA (n 59).
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endangerment inding, few consider its with-
drawal likely – the EPA would have to establish 
new emission guidelines. Only if a federal 
court rules that the EPA lacks the authority to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from exist-
ing sources – an argument cited by several 
petitioners in litigation73 – would a rescission 
without replacement be legally admissible. 
Moderate voices in the administration as well as 
a majority of private sector constituencies have 
therefore called for a new rule that is narrower 
in scope and ofers greater compliance lexibil-
ity, but avoids a protracted legal battle about 
EPA authority to regulate greenhouse gases. 
Even weakened standards would have to be 
justiied with reasoning based on the provisions 
of the Clean Air Act or risk being considered 
‘arbitrary and capricious’.74 More conservative 
voices and several close White House advisers, 
meanwhile, have repeatedly insisted on a full 
repeal, and also called for the endangerment 
inding to be withdrawn, efectively challenging 
the scientiic consensus on climate change.75 As 
with other elements of the president’s agenda, 
either process will likely be slow, contentious, 
and accompanied by litigation.
Finally, the administration could seek to under-
mine the efect of President Obama’s regulatory 
legacy by refusing to enforce compliance obli-
gations. In that case, however, the regulations 
would remain in full force, afording stakehold-
ers and other persons the standing to initiate 
judicial proceedings – for instance a citizen 
suit under Section 304(a) of the Clean Air Act – 
against the relevant agency or alleged violators 
to enforce those obligations. Also, while laxity 
73  US Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Docket for 
State of West Virginia et al. v EPA et al., No. 15–1363 
(and consolidated cases) (D.C. Cir., 23 October 2015). 
74  Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (n 93) § 706(2)(A).
75  Lisa Friedman, ‘As Trump Takes Aim at Obama’s Clean 
Power Plan, a Legal Battle Looms’ (New York Times, 29 
September 2017), A13.
in the enforcement of environmental rules has 
deinitely been used as a political strategy under 
earlier administrations, it has practical limita-
tions, as most companies in afected sectors 
will still follow the law and protect their public 
reputation. A casual approach to enforcement 
will therefore only aford partial relief to com-
pliance entities, and entail new and undesirable 
uncertainty.
he limits of federal climate policy
For all the discussion about the scope of regula-
tory rollback facing US climate policy, it is also 
important to note the constitutional limits on 
federal powers in the area of climate change, as 
well as the role of market dynamics in driving 
the reduction of carbon emissions. 
Under the US Constitution, both the federal and 
state governments enjoy some exclusive powers 
in the areas of energy and environmental policy, 
and exercise other powers in common. As a 
result, climate legislation and executive rule-
making in the US form a dynamic and evolving 
tapestry of federal, state and local action,76 
with a periodically shifting locus of progressive 
climate ambition.77 Many policies that are driv-
ing emission reductions across North America, 
such as binding mitigation targets, renew-
able portfolio standards, and energy eiciency 
standards, have been adopted at the state level, 
while federal policy – with the exception of 
international diplomacy – arguably played only 
a limited role until well into President Obama’s 
irst term. Previously, the US had no federal 
climate targets, and between periods of federal 
inaction and time lost over failed attempts to 
pass federal climate legislation, progressive 
76  For an overview, see Michael Mehling and David 
J. Frenkil, ‘Climate Law in the United States: Facing 
Structural and Procedural Limitations’ in Erkki J. Hol-
lo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling (eds), Climate 
Change and the Law (Springer 2013) 480–81.
77  Barry Rabe, ‘Contested Federalism and American Cli-
mate Policy’ (2011), 41 Publius 494.
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states and municipalities inevitably rose to ill 
the policy vacuum.
Greenhouse gas emissions in the US have 
declined signiicantly in recent years, drop-
ping 11.2% between 2005 and 2015,78 even as 
many federal climate policies have yet to exert 
a noticeable efect. Outpacing overall emis-
sion abatement, emissions from electricity 
generation are currently at their lowest level 
since 1993, another major trend unforeseen 
only a few years ago. Over two-thirds of those 
reductions are ascribed to fuel switching from 
coal to natural gas, a result of falling gas prices 
made possible by the rapid growth in supply 
from increasingly eicient hydraulic fractur-
ing practices.79 A corollary of this competition 
between coal and gas is the falling demand for 
coal, which has declined 27% since 2005 and 
signiicantly weakened the coal mining indus-
try, along with its employment potential.80 
Adding to the competitive pressures facing coal 
is another sector in which innovation and scale 
78  EPA, ‘Draft Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions and Sinks: 1990–2015’ 10 (15 February 2017) 
<www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-02/docu-
ments/2017_complete_report.pdf> accessed 29 March 
2017.
79  Energy Information Administration (EIA), ‘U.S. En-
ergy-related Carbon Dioxide Emissions in 2015 are 
12% Below Their 2005 Levels’ (9 May 2016) <www.eia.
gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26152> accessed 29 
March 2017.
80  Coal had seen a steep decline in jobs across its supply 
chain well before the Obama administration began im-
plementing climate regulations, see e.g. Drew Haer-
er and Lincoln Pratson, ‘Employment Trends in the U.S. 
Electricity Sector, 2008–2012’ (2015), 82 Energy Policy 
85.  <www.eenews.net/assets/2017/03/27/document_
gw_04.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
are rapidly lowering prices: renewable energy.81 
In 2016 alone, the US saw the installation of 
nearly 15 GW of new solar photovoltaic generat-
ing capacity, outpacing any other source of new 
generation.82 With deployment increasingly 
independent from policy support, movement 
by many US states to expand their renewable 
energy mandates, and public investment in 
research and development continuing in other 
parts of the world even as the US might cut back 
federal funds, the global market for renewable 
energy is unlikely to lose momentum. 
However, it would also be misguided to dismiss 
the role of federal action in limiting emissions. 
Projections by the Energy Information Admin-
istration for 2017 illustrate the diference in coal 
consumption in the US to 2040 with and with-
out the Clean Power Plan or a similar regulation 
(Figure 1).
Although less tangible, the signalling efect of 
federal policy direction in shaping the expec-
tations of the private sector can be critical 
for sound strategic planning and investment 
choices compatible with the long time horizon 
of decarbonization. Taken together, the various 
ways in which federal policy nonetheless afects 
US emissions have prompted analysts to project 
that the regulatory rollback pursued by the 
Trump administration will slow down emis-
sion reductions from 21% to 14% below 2005 
81  The central role of natural gas in displacing coal was 
even affirmed by a study commissioned by the Depart-
ment of Energy that many observers saw as a political 
manoeuvre to defend coal and undermine support for 
renewable energy, see US Department of Energy, Staff 
Report to the Secretary on Electricity Markets and Reli-
ability (August 2017)  <https://energy.gov/sites/prod/
files/2017/08/f36/Staff%20Report%20on%20Electric-
ity%20Markets%20and%20Reliability_0.pdf>.
82  Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) and GTM 
Research, ‘U.S. Solar Market Insight 2016 Year in Re-
view’ (9 March 2017) <www.greentechmedia.com/
research/subscription/u.s.-solar-market-insight> 
accessed 29 March 2017.
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emissions by 2025.83 Another recent assessment 
saw less immediate efects, but pointed out that 
‘the Trump efect really begins to bite into the 
U.S. emissions reductions in 2025’.84
Factoring in the risk that future administra-
tions will reinstate any carbon constraints 
withdrawn by the Trump administration, it 
is unsurprising that utilities mostly expect a 
sustained transition to renewable energy and 
natural gas, and are planning their investment 
83  John Larsen, Kate Larsen, Whitney Ketchum, 
Shashank Mohan, and Trevor Houser, ‘Trump’s Regula-
tory Rollback Begins’ (27 March 2017) <http://rhg.com/
notes/trumps-regulatory-rollback-begins> accessed 
29 March 2017.
84  Climate Advisers, ‘Trump BackTracker’ (June 2017) 
<http://www.climateadvisers.com/trumpbacktrack-
er> accessed 12 June 2017.
decisions accordingly.85 Regulatory relief from 
the reform agenda of the current administration 
may make some coal companies economically 
more viable, and may help delay the retirement 
of older thermal generation capacity. Increased 
exports of liqueied natural gas may also result 
in higher domestic prices, temporarily revers-
ing some of the fuel switching efects observed 
in recent years.86 Should that trend amplify over 
time, rules like the Clean Power Plan and the 
New Source Performance Standard might have 
played an important, but ultimately hypotheti-
cal, role as hedges against a coal revival driven 
by evolving market fundamentals. his does 
not negate the argument that federal climate 
85  Utility Dive, ‘State of the Electric Utility Survey 2017’ 
(28 March 2017) <https://s3.amazonaws.com/dive_
assets/rlpsys/SEU_2017.pdf> accessed 29 March 2017.
86  Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2 ‘Short-
Term Energy Outlook (STEO)’ (11 April 2017) <www.eia.
gov/outlooks/steo/pdf/steo_full.pdf> accessed 11 April 
2017.
Figure 1. Coal is projected to maintain its current role in electricity generation unless Clean Power Plan, or a similar 
set of policies, is put in place (Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2017).
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regulations have so far played a subordinate 
role to market dynamics and state or local 
action in driving recent emission reductions. 
For international observers, however, that may 
provide little consolation.
From climate leader to wavering laggard 
‘[The Paris Agreement] is a bad deal for America. It’s an 
“America second, third or fourth” kind of approach.’
Scott Pruitt, Fox News, 13 April 2017
he annulment of domestic regulations such as 
the Clean Power Plan can also impact the politi-
cal dynamics of international climate coopera-
tion. Although it is too early to fully appreciate 
the international repercussions, this section 
briely considers the issue of US leadership and 
global climate politics. 
he ideological drivers that shape US involve-
ment in global governance are similar to those 
that are at play domestically. he ideology of 
the so-called Alt-Right and its igurehead Ste-
phen K. Bannon, the former Chief Strategist of 
the White House, has been repeatedly laid out 
in media outlets such as Breitbart News, the 
right-wing nationalist website Bannon helped 
establish and once again runs. he editorial 
positions of Breitbart News have been closely 
aligned with Donald Trump’s campaign rheto-
ric, conveying a speciic narrative. According 
to Daniel Kreiss,87 the central theme to emerge 
in Breitbart News reporting during and imme-
diately after the election was a narrative of 
‘taking back our country’. Domestic aspects of 
this project have tended to take centre stage 
– it is on the home front here where Donald 
Trump’s electoral base, the ‘ly-over states’, 
the ‘deplorables’ and ‘real America’, have 
87  Kreiss, Daniel, ‘Trump, Breitbart, and the re-
jection of multicultural democracy’ (Vox, 20 
January 2017), <http://www.vox.com/the-big-
idea/2017/1/30/14431544/trump-breitbart-rejection-
multicultural-democracy>. 
taken aim at Democrats, the mainstream media, 
minorities, establishment Republicans, and 
Washington insiders. Importantly, however, 
these targets also include cosmopolitanism 
and globalism, represented by international 
organizations such as the UN and the WTO, as 
well as multinational corporations. Inevitably, 
the suspicions harboured against international 
cooperation have also extended to climate 
change, and perhaps most importantly, to the 
UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement. 
In this philosophy of retrenchment, cosmopoli-
tanism should be replaced with a system that 
empowers ordinary people over coastal elites 
and international institutions.88 Nigel Farage, 
one of the key igures of the Brexit movement 
in the United Kingdom, has highlighted this 
international dimension of the right-wing pop-
ulist agenda. During a recent trip to the US, he 
opined that ‘Steve [Bannon] is the person with 
an international perspective on all of this. He’s 
got a good feel for the direction that he wants 
to see across the West’. he parallel narratives 
of the Brexit campaign in the UK and the Trump 
campaign in the US have been highlighted by 
many analysts. Trump himself tweeted after the 
Brexit vote that ‘[t]hey took their country back, 
just like we will take America back’.89
he Paris Agreement: In or out?
On the campaign trail, Donald Trump repeat-
edly claimed that he would ‘cancel’ or ‘rip 
up’ the Paris Agreement. Several of his closest 
advisors, including Stephen Bannon and Scott 
Pruitt, have also been outspoken in their sup-
port of abandoning the Agreement. Pruitt has 
called it ‘a bad deal’ because ‘China and India, 
the largest producers of CO2 internationally, got 
88  ‘Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for “Deconstruction of 
the Administrative State”’ (Washington Post, 23 Feb-
ruary 2017).
89  ‘Donald Trump on Brexit: They Took Their Country 
Back; We Will Take America Back’ (Breitbart, 24 June 
2016).
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away scot-free’.90 Research commissioned by 
conservative groups showing that the US would 
sufer substantial economic losses if it remained 
in the Paris Agreement was widely cited by 
those pressuring the president to withdraw; 
conservative media outlets joined the debate 
by publishing countless articles claiming that 
climate change is a hoax; and Bannon himself 
took on the role of pressuring President Trump 
to convert his campaign promises into policy 
actions. By contrast, more moderate forces 
within the administration, such as Secretary of 
State Rex W. Tillerson and Secretary of Defense 
James N. Mattis, expressed support for remain-
ing in the Paris Agreement, noting the impor-
tance of retaining a ‘seat at the table’.91 
After a protracted and suspenseful process 
involving several meetings and announce-
ments of an imminent decision, President 
Trump, speaking from the Rose Garden, inally 
announced his decision to withdraw on 1 June 
2017.92 Drawing on a narrative of ‘America 
First’, and with barely any mention of climate 
change, the president cited his concern about 
‘the wellbeing of American citizens’ as justiica-
tion for abandoning ‘a deal that punishes the 
United States’ and threatens to leave ‘millions 
and millions of families trapped in poverty and 
joblessness’. Isolationist reaction reverberated 
throughout the speech, with remarks such as 
‘I was elected to represent the citizens of Pitts-
burgh, not Paris’ and his emphasis on protect-
ing ‘the United States from future intrusions on 
the United States’ sovereignty’. Intriguingly, 
90  ‘New EPA Chief Calls Paris Climate Accord a “Bad 
Deal”’ (The Hill, 26 March 2017). 
91  ‘Tillerson Does not Deny Climate Change – But Dodges 
Questions about Exxon’s Role in Sowing Doubt’ (Wash-
ington Post, 11 January 2017).
92  The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
‘Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Ac-
cord’ (1 June 2017) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2017/06/01/statement-president-
trump-paris-climate-accord> accessed 5 June 2017.
however, the president expressed openness 
to renegotiating the Agreement, provided it 
creates a ‘framework that is fair’ and where 
the burdens and responsibilities are ‘equally 
shared’ around the world, conditions which 
have not been further speciied since the origi-
nal announcement.
With this announcement, the administration 
ended speculation about the scope and timing 
of a US withdrawal from the climate regime. 
Rather than withdrawing from the UNFCCC or 
merely weakening or ignoring the US mitiga-
tion pledge, the administration has formally 
declared that it will exercise the process 
detailed in Article 28 of the Paris Agreement, 
which allows parties to pull out at ‘any time 
after three years’ from the date on which the 
Agreement entered into force for them, with 
efect ‘upon expiry of one year from the date of 
receipt … of the notiication of withdrawal’.93 
As the Paris Agreement entered into force for 
the US on 4 November 2016, the earliest date 
by which the latter could notify its withdrawal 
is 4 November 2019, allowing the withdrawal 
to take efect no earlier than 4 November 2020, 
after the next US elections and right at the end 
of President Trump’s current term in oice. 
For the time being, the US has communi-
cated its intention to remain involved in the 
negotiations on further implementation of 
the Paris Agreement. While the US ‘intends 
to exercise withdrawal provisions when it 
is able to do so’, it is also identifying ‘suit-
able terms for re-engagement’ and ‘protecting 
ongoing U.S. interests and preserving future 
policy options’.94 For example, Security Adviser 
93  See Decision 1/CP.21, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
Annex, UN Doc. FCCC/CP2-15/10/Add.1 (29 January 
2016) Art. 28 (1) and (2).
94  Guidance and talking points issued by the State De-
partment to its embassies on 4 August 2017, obtained 
and published by Reuters, see <http://live.reuters.
com/Event/Live_US_Politics/1051797571> accessed 14 
September 2017.
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H. R. McMaster recently noted that staying in 
the Paris Agreement was possible ‘if there’s an 
agreement that beneits the American people, 
certainly’.95 What would the so-called suit-
able terms for re-engagement be? Several key 
players such as China, the EU and Canada have 
recently responded that opening up the Paris 
Agreement was not possible.96 ‘Re-engagement’ 
sounds like a euphemism for submitting a 
weaker US pledge – and hope for some other 
concessions, perhaps enabling climate inance 
or technology transfer to promote coal invest-
ments as well.
Although weakened under the Trump Admin-
istration, the State Department – whose Sec-
retary Tillerson had advocated for staying in 
the Paris Agreement – will continue to lead the 
US delegation during these negotiations. As 
former UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana 
Figueres has noted, it is diicult to foresee 
whether continued US engagement in the 
international climate process will be helpful or 
disruptive, as there would be ‘advantages and 
extraordinary disadvantages’ for other coun-
tries if the US decided to leave.97 
Although the Paris Agreement provides a legal 
framework, much of its operational details 
have yet to be leshed out. Negotiators thus 
have important rule-making work to accom-
plish. During the presidency of George W. Bush, 
the US delegation was widely perceived as a 
di cult partner at international climate nego-
tiations. Based on that experience, consensus 
among big emitters and other North-South 
95  Nicki Zinc, ‘Trump could keep US in climate accord 
with deal ‘that benefits the American people’: Adviser’ 
(ABC News, 17 September 2017).
96  Shawn McCarthy, ‘U.S. will not seek Paris Accord 
revamp amid 34 countries’ call to action on climate 
change’ (The Globe and Mail, 16 September 2017). 
97  Alister Doyle, ‘Threatened U.S. Pullout Might Help, 
not Hobble, Global Climate Pact’ (Reuters, 27 March 
2017).
compromises would be easier to achieve with-
out  the US ‘preserving policy options’ at the 
negotiating table. Either way, the US is creating 
a precedent by either lowering or completely 
ignoring a national contribution under the 
Paris Agreement.98 At the very least, such 
downgrading violates the spirit of the Paris 
Agreement, and the idea of a ‘virtuous cycle’ of 
ever more ambitious pledges. A breach could 
thus upset the carefully balanced architecture 
of the Agreement,99 and impact the prospect 
of raising what is currently still an inadequate 
level of collective climate ambition. With the US 
efectively out of the Agreement, the likelihood 
of other countries ratcheting up their pledges 
may have become more remote.100
What is more, the bottom-up model of the 
Paris Agreement is based on a cycle of pledge 
and review. Its ‘success hinges on review’, as 
David Victor has noted; and here a voluntary 
and proactive role for the US would have been 
of critical importance. Under the previous 
administration, the US had already volun-
teered to carry out a peer review of its fossil 
fuel subsidies together with China – a process 
that will now in all likelihood be abandoned. As 
anyone observing the UNFCCC negotiations can 
conirm, compulsory international scrutiny is 
di cult to agree upon, as countries quickly fear 
threats to their national sovereignty. Without 
leadership, Victor argues, the review process 
will probably ‘follow narrow and bureaucratic 
98  See Luke Kemp, ‘Better Out than In’ (2017), 7 Nature 
Climate Change 458–460.
99  Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The US and the Paris Agreement: 
In or Out and at What Cost?’ (10 May 2017) <https://
www.ejiltalk.org/the-us-and-the-paris-agreement-
in-or-out-and-at-what-cost>.
100  Jason Bordoff, ‘Withdrawing from the Paris Climate 
Agreement Hurts the US’ (2017), 2 Nature Energy 17145.
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UN rules’ and be ‘impotent’.101 China has a long 
history of arguing against rigorous transpar-
ency measures in the UN climate talks, and 
without US leadership, Chinese cooperation on 
transparency may be lost.102
It is also worth noting that the US currently 
contributes a signiicant share of international 
climate finance made available by wealthy 
countries for the developing world – of the 
$10.3 billion pledged to the Green Climate Fund, 
$3 billion has been pledged by the US, but only 
about one-third of this pledge has actually been 
delivered. In his remarks accompanying the 
decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, 
President Trump expressly mentioned the aim 
of ‘ending the implementation of the nationally 
determined contribution and, very importantly, 
the Green Climate Fund, which is costing the 
United States a vast fortune’. A leaked cable by 
the State Department also conirms that the US 
will not honour its pledge,103 something that 
could have repercussions by making further 
North-South compromises more di cult in the 
UNFCCC negotiations. Taken together, these 
factors will make it very di cult to sustain the 
momentum of progress that accompanied the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement. 
International repercussions
One implication that will invariably emerge in 
light of the domestic climate policy reversal is 
that the US will not honour its pledge of reduc-
ing its emissions 26 to 28 percent below 2005 
101  David Victor, ‘How Trump Could Reverse U.S. Cli-
mate Cooperation’ (Brookings, 17 November 2016) 
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-cha-
os/2016/11/17/how-trump-could-reverse-u-s-cli-
mate-cooperation>.
102  Bordoff (n. 100).
103  See <http://live.reuters.com/Event/Live_US_Poli-
tics/1051797571> accessed 14 September 2017.
levels by 2025.104  Coupled with the US deci-
sion to abandon the Paris Agreement, this may 
empower opponents of climate action in other 
key countries. 
At this point, it is di cult to speculate on how 
and when other countries might react to the 
foregoing announcements by the US. Common 
sense would suggest that the withdrawal of the 
largest historical emitter should undermine 
the case for domestic climate action elsewhere, 
but as several experts have pointed out, most 
governments are likely to keep their current 
pledges, which are not seen to be overly ambi-
tious anyway. Absent US leadership on climate 
change, some nations might even seek to ill 
some of the ensuing void: Europe may be too 
preoccupied with internal crises to resume its 
earlier role as a champion of international cli-
mate policy ambition,105 but emerging nations 
such as China might perceive a stronger role in 
the process as a strategic opportunity.106 his 
view, however, assumes that the progressive, 
internationalist worldview prevails against 
competing factions in Beijing, an assumption 
that may prove overly optimistic. 
For the time being, it appears unlikely that 
other countries will follow the US and com-
pletely withdraw from the Paris Agreement, 
but that does not mean that the course taken by 
the Trump administration will remain without 
104  United States, ‘US Nationally Determined Con-
tribution’ (3 September 2016) <http://www4.unfc-
cc.int/ndcregistry/PublishedDocuments/United%20
States%20of%20America%20First/U.S.A.%20
First%20NDC%20Submission.pdf> accessed 29 March 
2017.
105  Michael Mehling, Kati Kulovesi, and Javier de Cendra 
de Larragán, ‘Climate Law and Policy in the European 
Union: Accidental Success or Deliberate Leadership?’ in 
Erkki J. Hollo, Kati Kulovesi and Michael Mehling (eds), 
Climate Change and the Law 509–520  (Springer 2013).
106  David Victor, ‘Trump: China Could Take Lead on Cli-
mate’ (2016), 539 Nature 495.
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international consequences. One of the most 
relevant countries in this regard is arguably 
India, which is known to look closely at the 
actions of the US, and often plays the moral 
card during international negotiations.107 At 
the Conference of the Parties in Marrakech in 
late 2016, India was described as maintaining a 
‘strategic quiet’ on various policy issues.108 India 
is one of the major emitters, an emerging econ-
omy undergoing an economic transition with 
rising energy needs for continued development 
and urbanization. Expanding use of coal and 
renewable energy are both important policy 
goals, and air quality and climate protection are 
also of increasing concern. India’s international 
engagements relect these motivations. 
It is amid these circumstances and a conten-
tious debate on the respective weight aforded 
to mitigation and adaptation in Indian climate 
policy that the international context can afect 
domestic dynamics. If others are perceived as 
taking action, the progressives are empowered 
to push for stronger climate policies, emphasiz-
ing the co-beneits. If it becomes evident that 
the wealthy US is free-riding, however, the 
more defensive or ‘realist’ mindset will gain 
traction. One Indian analyst pointed out that US 
withdrawal renders the targets of the remain-
ing countries ‘meaningless’,109 while another 
scholar noted that Trump’s order ‘would give 
the Indian government political space to delay 
107  Antto Vihma, ‘India and the Global Climate Govern-
ance: Between Principles and Pragmatism’ (2011), 20(1) 
Journal of Environment and Development 69–94.
108 ‘The Future of India’s Climate Diplomacy: Trump, 
China and Other Factors’ (Climate Diplomacy, 22 De-
cember 2016).
109  ‘What Does Donald Trump’s Victory Mean for Cli-
mate Change Agreement’ (News18, 9 November 2016) 
<http://www.news18.com/news/world/what-does-
donald-trumps-victory-means-for-climate-change-
agreement-1310222.html>.
some of its climate commitments’.110 Similar 
dynamics are also at play in India’s northern 
neighbour, China. As noted by some analysts, 
Trump’s actions ‘may empower business and 
political interests within China that still oppose 
climate action’.111
But more optimistic voices have also been 
raised. Prominent Indian commentators such 
as Chandra Buschan112 and Sunita Narain113 
have argued that US withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement enables the rest of the world 
to renegotiate a ‘stronger agreement’, which 
would include notions such as ‘equitable 
allocation of the carbon budget’. As the Paris 
Agreement is a inely balanced and hard-won 
package, however, it is di cult to see how such 
a renegotiation could be successful. 
Bilateral relations between the US and China 
during Trump’s presidency are likely to be 
characterized by further emphasis on zero-sum 
competition and economic nationalism, as well 
as geopolitical tensions concerning, inter alia, 
North Korea, Iran, and the South-China Sea. 
During  President Obama’s second term, the 
US and China played a central role in laying 
fertile ground for the Paris Agreement through 
their bilateral climate eforts, including joint 
announcements of emission-cutting goals 
and policies.114 his cooperation beneitted the 
global negotiations, and arguably enabled the 
110  ‘Trump Signs Executive Order Unwinding Obama 
Climate Policies’ (New York Times, 28 March 2017).
111  New York Times (n. 110).
112  Chandra Bhushan , ‘Why the US Should Quit the 
Paris Agreement’ <http://www.downtoearth.org.in/
news/why-the-us-should-quit-the-paris-agree-
ment-56473>.
113  Sunita Narain, ‘Revenge of the Rich’ <http://www.
cseindia.org/content/revenge-rich>.
114  Andrew Restuccia and Michael Crowley, ‘The Climate 
Deal that Almost Wasn’t’ (Politico, 11 December 2014).
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two countries to go further with their national 
contributions than they would otherwise have 
done. 
Finally, President Trump has demonstrated 
a distinct drive to promote fossil-fuel trade 
and projects abroad. He has already personally 
engaged in energy diplomacy, discussing fossil 
fuel trade with, for example, Heads of State of 
India, South Korea, and Ukraine, while also 
demanding that various cabinet oicials make 
oil, gas, and coal exports a priority.115 A sig-
niicant issue is whether and how hard the US 
will push for multilateral development banks 
to inance fossil fuel projects such as coal power 
plants in developing countries. A pressing case 
is the Green Climate Fund. he leaked State 
Department cable from August is worrisome in 
this regard, citing greater lexibility, develop-
ing countries’ energy needs, economic growth, 
and a ‘full range of power projects’.116 Accord-
ing to the cable, the relevant agencies are ‘in 
the process of reviewing policies to ensure 
alignment with the President’s energy goals 
and priorities’.117
Conclusions
Although the factors underlying the ascent of 
Donald Trump and his political worldview are 
unusual in their timing and ferocity, they all 
have deeper roots in the historical sediment of 
US politics. What remains is a complex kalei-
doscope of actors, actions, and constraints. 
America’s oicial position on climate change 
has become clear during the irst year of Don-
ald Trump’s presidency. Although he tends to 
project slogans rather than strategy, his admin-
istration has moved quickly, consistently, and 
115  Michael T. Clare, ‘Carbon-Pusher-in Chief: Trump’s 
fossil-fueled foreign policy’ (Energy Post, 4 August 
2017).
116  Reuters (n. 94).
117  Reuters (n. 94).
with vigour to dismantle existing US climate 
policies. At irst glance, the scale of regulatory 
roll-back is unprecedented. 
Still, the deregulation project faces severe 
obstacles, both judicial and political. A system 
of checks and balances and federal allocation of 
powers that long predates the climate change 
debate may aford existing climate action sur-
prising resilience against an ideological assault. 
Pending a legislative amendment or judicial 
determination that relieves the administration 
of its statutory obligation to regulate green-
house gas emissions, for instance, the EPA will 
arguably ind itself in a vulnerable position 
whenever it seeks to weaken or repeal existing 
executive rules, and could be forced to ofer a 
reasoned argument as to why the growing body 
of scientiic evidence on the reality and impacts 
of climate change nonetheless justiies scaling 
back action. Other federal agencies are bound 
by similar mandates, such as the Department 
of Transportation with its requirement to issue 
fuel economy standards under federal energy 
legislation. In all cases, challenging the legal 
basis would require overturning established 
case law of the Supreme Court or overcoming 
a ilibuster with a supermajority in the Senate. 
More likely, executive eforts to reverse cli-
mate regulation will have the efect of delay-
ing progress, which translates into lost time 
for climate mitigation and adaptation, and a 
temporary reprieve for those opposing action. 
An inevitable companion of these delays is 
regulatory uncertainty, the natural antagonist 
of strategic investment decisions, such as those 
required to achieve long-term decarbonization 
of the economy. In the long run, for instance, 
the role of coal power may not decline as 
quickly as it would have done with the Clean 
Power Plan or similar federal regulations. While 
less dramatic than an outright reversal of cli-
mate action, delays and uncertainty represent 
a tangible  setback. 
Unable to fully reverse the disputed climate 
legacy of his predecessor, Donald Trump’s 
deregulatory activism may well be remembered 
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for its symbolic bluster and populist rheto-
ric.  However, the cumulative efects of these 
actions will have implications for the trajectory 
of US greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, 
measured against the level of policy ambition 
needed to achieve meaningful decarbonization 
in the US, which would not only require strict 
enforcement of existing climate regulations, 
but also their rapid acceleration and expansion 
across all areas of the economy, it becomes clear 
that the delays, the policy uncertainty, and the 
weakening or selective withdrawal of agency 
actions and capacities could be devastating. 
hey are far removed from the required trajec-
tory of climate policy – a course even President 
Obama was unable to maintain. When consid-
ering the inordinate amount of time, efort and 
resources invested in elaborating some of the 
regulations and orders that are now being chal-
lenged, the scale of this setback becomes evi-
dent. Some changes, moreover, such as severely 
curtailed agency budgets and staf capacities, 
may have a lasting impact beyond the current 
administration and could initially constrain 
the ability of more progressive successors to 
rebuild a robust climate policy framework. 
Second, this analysis has also focused on the 
American political pattern and its current 
implications on climate and energy policy. 
Following the recent election, a single party 
now holds the presidency and controls the 115th 
Congress, having majorities in both the House 
of Representatives and the Senate. Republicans 
also hold a majority of governorships and state 
legislatures, afording them a concentration 
of power that will enable greater transforma-
tional change than in many prior decades. And 
Donald Trump, efectively the leader of the 
Republican Party, brings a brand of national-
ist populism that sets him apart from recent 
predecessors. While climate policy has long 
been an issue that elicits open hostility among 
many conservatives, the new president and his 
cabinet have been described as a ‘triumph of 
climate denial’,118 dispensing with any remain-
ing hesitation to oppose climate action – and 
even the acknowledgment of climate science – 
on political grounds. As the impacts of a warm-
ing atmosphere become increasingly evident in 
the US, and droughts, forest ires, or extreme 
weather events such as hurricanes Harvey and 
Irma cause greater damage year after year, sur-
veys have shown growing concern about cli-
mate change. But still, the underlying politics 
remain as partisan as ever. A darker message of 
this analysis is therefore the deep polarization 
over climate change and the cyclical pattern of 
US politics.
Partisan opposition and a polarized discourse 
are the norm in US climate politics, and have 
reached a current peak that may recede, but 
not disappear, under future administrations. 
Even if contemporary policy decisions prove 
to be temporary outliers, science denialism 
and political opportunism will surface time 
and again in the US debate about climate 
change. For the time being, President Trump 
seems intent upon using the reversal of cli-
mate policy progress under his predecessor as 
a means of advancing his declared objective 
of ‘deconstructing the administrative state’, 
as his former Chief Strategist Bannon once 
framed it.119 Donald Trump’s very presidency 
validates the argument that large segments of 
the electorate are deeply uncomfortable with 
secular, progressive America, its meritocracy, 
and its growing diversity and internationalism 
– a liberal outlook on which climate change is a 
perceived part.
118  Clare Foran, ‘Donald Trump and the Triumph of Cli-
mate-Change Denial’ (The Atlantic, 25 December 2016) 
<www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/don-
ald-trump-climate-change-skeptic-denial/51035> 
accessed 29 March 2017.
119  Philip Rucker and Robert Costa, ‘Bannon Press-
es “Deconstruction”’ (Washington Post, 24 February 
2017), A1.
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In the end, America’s Madisonian model of 
government will ensure that climate progress 
can continue, even if it is less visible and 
more heterogeneous than it was during the 
last administration. Still, the power to deine 
foreign policy rests with the executive branch, 
and that comes with numerous opportunities 
for obstruction, as exempliied by tensions in 
the Ministerial Meetings of the Group of Seven 
(G7).120 Severely diminished contributions 
to international climate inance will have an 
impact on the political dynamic in international 
climate negotiations, and a disengaged US may 
well have a chilling efect on the stocktaking 
and periodic review processes under the Paris 
Agreement. 
For over two decades, US commentators have 
theorized about the shortcomings of multilat-
eral diplomacy and conventional rulemaking,121 
calling for less rigid, less centralized approaches 
to international climate cooperation. And yet, 
the Paris Agreement – with its purportedly 
more accommodating architecture – has still 
failed to retain the participation of the larg-
est cumulative emitter in history. Although 
conceptually appealing, the assumption that 
greater lexibility would promote broader and, 
over time, deeper climate engagement clearly 
failed to anticipate the nationalist entrench-
ment of the current White House occupant. 
Donald Trump and his worldview do not trile 
with subtleties of regime architecture. His 
overarching project, one that is shared by large 
segments of the electorate, is more sweeping 
in scope: it is about ‘taking the country back’ 
from a perceived cultural and economic decline, 
a decline which many blame on globalization 
and cosmopolitanism. 
120  Andrew Restuccia, ‘Trump’s Climate Demands 
Roil U.S. Allies’ (Politico, 11 April 2017) <www.polit-
ico.com/story/2017/04/trump-fossil-fuels-g7-ten-
sion-237129> accessed 12 April 2017.
121  See e.g. David G. Victor, ‘How to Slow Global Warm-
ing’ (1991), 349:6309 Nature 451.
hat said, it is worth noting that even this 
administration has chosen to withdraw from 
the Paris Agreement in full adherence to the 
procedures set out in the treaty itself, evidenc-
ing the normative force aforded to interna-
tional law even by a defecting party. And that, 
coupled with the important role played by 
domestic procedural and judicial constraints, 
may give hope to those who still believe in a 
world based on the rule of law, where ends do 
not justify all means; where political extremes 
are tempered and their proponents held 
accountable by a system of lived, legitimate 
norms that both predate and will continue to 
exist well beyond the disruptive impulse of the 
moment.
